This paper studies whether there exists private information in the foreign exchange market, and whether speculation reduces or exacerbates volatility. It makes use of a recent data set on foreign currency positions by large market participants that include positions on options and other derivatives. This is the first data set that describes comprehensive currency positions of market participants. There are two main findings. First, not only the absolute value of the options position but also that of spot, forward and futures positions by large participants Granger-causes exchange rate volatility. This suggests that the large participants' currency speculation does not stabilize exchange rate volatility. Second, regression analyses do not find any positive association between large participants' position in a foreign currency with its subsequent appreciation. A non-parametric approach finds some weak support for a positive association but not on a systematic level. This casts into doubt the view that large participants have better information about the future movement of exchange rates. It further strengthens the case that the large players trade on noise rather than on information.
Introduction
With one trillion dollars per day, the weekly trading volume in the foreign exchange market is five times larger than the annual volume of the world goods trade. 1 This gigantic asset market also has enormous volatility. Contrary to the predictions of the monetary approach to exchange rate determination, Flood and Rose (1995) showed that the floating exchange rate system after 1973 is associated with substantially higher exchange rate volatility than the pre-1970 period, without any discernible difference in the volatility of economic and policy fundamentals. This suggests, though does not prove, that the trading process itself may generate unnecessary volatility that is not based on real information. Even George Soros, who is known to have made a penny or two speculating in the foreign exchange market, thinks that the answer is affirmative, as shown by the opening quote of this paper.
Another nagging question about this market is whether there exists asymmetric information among traders that may be price relevant. The conventional answer has been no even though there may be asymmetry between a central bank and traders. A recent paper by Lyons, Ito and Melvin (1997) found that the intra-day pattern of exchange rate volatility changes after the Tokyo market lifted its lunch-hour trading restrictions. The authors interpreted the changes as a reflection of asymmetric information in the market. 2 This question is important because the existence of informational asymmetry would suggest that we should begin to focus more attention on exchange rate models in which traders are optimizing agents. Such models are still rare in the international finance literature.
In this paper, we study the behavior of very large market participants. We aim to shed light on two questions. First, does the trading/speculation by these very large participants tend to stabilize or exacerbate exchange rate volatility? Second, if any traders have better information, these large participants likely do. Does the data indicate that they actually have better information?
The two questions are of course related: if the large players do not have better information about future levels of exchange rate than the general public, it would be difficult for their trading positions to stabilize the exchange rate.
We are not aware of any study of the first question on the foreign exchange market. Lyons (1997) provided an interesting model of large trading volume in the foreign exchange market, but does not deal with its effect on volatility directly. On the second questions, there were a number of studies with inconclusive answers. VanBelle (1975 VanBelle ( , 1977 , Eaker (1977) , Mehta (1986, 1984) and So (1994) found that banks' currency positions in spot and swaps seem to demonstrate some ability to make correct predictions of the exchange rate. Using monthly data, Fieleke (1981) found that both bank and nonbank positions performed poorly as forecasters of exchange rates. He found that the position takers in his study generally failed to earn even a gross return on their positions. The problem with these studies is that their data did not include certain important derivative products, namely options. In other words, an important part of the market participants' overall currency positions was missing. For the large players in our sample, for example, the net options positions over 1994-96 were over 25% of the total positions in spot, forward and futures. And this missing part has grown rapidly in importance relative to other currency products. A data set that covers options and thus provides a more comprehensive description of currency positions should offer more reliable inferences.
We make use of a data set recently collected and released by the U.S. Treasury. This data set has two important advantages over those in the earlier papers. First, it gives a more complete description of the market participants' positions by including information on options and other derivatives positions in addition to spot trading. Second, it is of relatively higher frequency (i.e., weekly positions).
On the first question, we note first that speculation, ex ante, is just as likely to reduce as to increase volatility. Friedman (1953) provided the classic argument for stabilizing speculation. His logic is (maybe deceptively) simple: destabilizing speculators lose money on average and would be driven out of the market eventually. On the other hand, recent models of noise trading (Kyle, 1985; Waldman, 1990a and 1990b ) provided a host of reasons why nonrational noise traders may not disappear from the market (i.e., they could earn higher expected returns for unknowingly bearing extra risk, and new generations of noise traders come to market continuously). Furthermore, rational speculators may take destabilizing positions in the presence of noise traders using feedback rules.
The rapid development of the derivatives markets, particularly that of currency options, coincides with an increase in the volatility. Of course, the direction of causality can, in principle, go either way. However, many people seem convinced that the use of derivatives has contributed to the increased volatility. As a former central banker told the Wall Street Journal, 3 A most foreignexchange traders now take it for granted that once in a while you will get a little extra kick in the price movement from a large number of options in the market. @ George Soros was reported to have compared the destabilizing effects of currency options to > crack = cocaine and called for greater regulation of currency derivatives.
4
Empirical work on the effect of currency derivatives on exchange rate volatility is lacking, in part, because of unavailability of data on derivatives usage. Studies of this question for other financial markets have reached apparently conflicting conclusions. We will later list these studies and offer a possibly unifying interpretation. Due to the same data availability problem, empirical studies of asymmetric information in the foreign exchange market are rare.
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We organize the paper in the following way. Section 2 explains the data. Section 3
investigates whether large participants = positions in foreign exchange are systematically associated Lyons (1995) made headway in studying the microstructure of the market by obtaining the order flow information of one trader for a week. Norman Fieleke (1981) made the first study of the forecasting ability of large U.S. firms by using their monthly currency positions released by the U.S. Treasury. His data set did not include positions in options and other derivatives.
with subsequent change in exchange rate volatility, and if so, what a plausible causality story should be. Section 4 turns attention to whether large participants = positions reflect their superior ability to forecast the level of exchange rate, using both parametric and non-parametric approaches. Section 5 provides concluding remarks.
Data
Large participants' foreign exchange position Data on the foreign exchange positions by large market participants come from the Treasury Bulletin, which, in September 1994, began publishing weekly time-series data on aggregate currency holdings by major foreign exchange market participants in the U.S.
Major foreign exchange participants are defined as those with more than $50 billion equivalent in foreign exchange contracts on the last business day of any calendar quarter during the previous year. According to authors' phone conversations with Treasury officials in charge of the data collection, in 1996, there were thirty-six entities that qualified as major participants. Of them, twenty-nine were commercial banks and the remaining seven were other forms of financial institutions. In accordance with law (31 U.S.C. 5315; 31 C.F.R. 128, Subpart C), weekly and monthly reports must be filed throughout the calendar year by these participants.
An important feature of these filings is that they include the derivative positions, specifically, the outstanding amounts of foreign exchange forward, futures and swaps contracts bought and sold, and one half the notional amount of foreign exchange options, in addition to spot contracts. Previous Treasury data released not only were of lower (i.e., monthly) frequency, but also omitted derivative positions which have become increasingly important over time.
The data are disaggregated by currencies but not by participants. The currencies covered include the British Sterling, Swiss Franc, Japanese Yen, German Deutschemark and Canadian Dollar. Weekly position data is available only since January 5, 1994. Thus, the sample period of this paper is from that day through December 25, 1996. A shortcoming of the data set is that it only reports net but not gross positions. 
Exchange rates and volatility
Daily exchange rate data used for this study was obtained from the DRI database (FACS).
We use offer rates at the close of the London market. For the purpose of this paper, using the middle point of the bid-ask rates, or using rates at a different time of the day would not make a difference.
Volatility measures were calculated by taking the standard deviation of daily returns (i.e., first difference in log exchange rates) over various time horizons (1, 2, 4, and 12-weeks) .
Position-Taking by Large Participants and Volatility of Exchange Rates
In this section, we investigate the relationship between position-taking by large participants and exchange rate volatility. Since options have been singled out as a particularly menacing culprit as discussed in the introductory section of the paper, we start with large participants = positions in options. Because options are only reported in terms of delta equivalent values, 6 we will examine only the relationship between the absolute value of the net delta equivalents and exchange rate volatility.
The effect of options trading on the volatility of underlying spot market has been an obsession in studies of other financial market. The results appear to be conflicting and confusing.
Those who studied the effect of listing of individual stock options generally found that they are associated with a reduction in subsequent stock price volatility (e.g., Hayes and Tennenbaum, 1979; Ma and Rao, 1988; Bansal, Pruitt and Wei, 1989; Skinner, 1989; Conrad, 1989; Nabar and Park, 6 The delta equivalent value is the product of the first derivative of the option value with respect to the spot exchange rate (according to the Black-Scholes formula) multiplied by the notional principal of the contract.
1989; and Damodaran and Lim, 1991a) . Those who studied the listing of individual commodity options also found a reduction in subsequent commodity price volatility (Working, 1960, in onion markets; Powers, 1970, in pork belly and live beef; and Cox, 1976 , in a number of commodity markets). On the other hand, those who studied the effect of stock index options usually found an increase in the underlying stock price volatility (e.g., Stoll, 1987; Harris, 1989b; Damodaran, 1990; and Blume, MacKinlay and Terker, 1989) . Similarly, studies of the GNMA market found that the options tend to either increase the volatility of the underlying prices (Figlewski, 1981; and Edwards, 1988a) or have no (statistically significant) effect (Simpson and Ireland, 1982; Corgel and Gay, 1984; and Moriarty and Tosini, 1985) .
These apparently conflicting findings have a possible unifying interpretation. In those markets (e.g., individual stocks and commodities) where asymmetric information is prevalent (between insiders and uninformed traders), introduction of options can bring out new information more quickly and, if this effect dominates, it can reduce the volatility of the underlying prices. In those markets where asymmetric information is negligible such as stock index or GNMA, options trading tends to mainly augment the speculative positions of noise traders or other uninformed traders, and hence raise the underlying price volatility. If we accept the conventional view that asymmetric information is negligible among foreign exchange traders, this interpretation would suggest that options trading may exacerbate foreign exchange volatility. On the other hand, if we subscribe to the alternative view as advocated by Lyons, Ito and Melvin (1997) , we may expect a negative association between options and volatility in the foreign exchange market.
Options Positions and Exchange Rate Volatility
We employ Granger-causality tests to examine the relationship between the absolute value of the options positions by large participants and exchange rate volatility. The tests are conducted on the pooled-sample as well as on five individual currencies, and for four different horizons (one, two, four and twelve weeks).
A typical specification is the following linear vector autoregression (VAR):
where OPT, the absolute value of the delta equivalent of the net outstanding foreign currency options contracts at the time of the survey (subsequently referred to as "options positions" for short); VOL is exchange rate volatility over a relevant time horizon; and AL, BL, CL, and DL are one-sided lag polynomials.
To test for Granger causality from options position (OPT) to volatility (VOL), in this framework, a standard joint test of exclusion restrictions (F-test) is used to determine whether lagged OPT has significant predictive power for current VOL. The null hypothesis that OPT does not Granger-cause VOL is rejected if the coefficients on AL are jointly significantly different from zero. We test for Granger causality from VOL to OPT in a similar manner. To determine the appropriate lag lengths for the lag polynomials, we minimize the Schwarz Bayesian Information Criterion (SBIC). It is useful to stress that Granger-causality is not the same thing as economic causality. Table 2 has not established that the options trading by large participants causes more volatility in the foreign exchange rate. It does establish that the option trading tends to lead to, in a time sequence sense, a subsequent increase in volatility.
Could this finding simply reflect the possibility that large traders have good information about the subsequent movement in the exchange rate volatility, and they adjust their options positions in anticipation of the movement? While it is difficult to give a definitive answer, we make a few observations. First, if the large participants truly have good information about future exchange rate volatility, they can in principle take advantage of it without any change in the net delta value of the options, for example, by simultaneously buying and selling calls and puts with the strike price equal to the current spot price (known as a straddle). Thus, options trading based on good information about future volatility may not necessarily induce a positive correlation between options positions and subsequent volatility.
Second, if options trading is executed to take advantage of information about future volatility, there is no reason that positions in the spot, forward and futures contracts should be positively related to subsequent exchange rate volatility. On the other hand, if both derivatives and spot contracts are employed to speculate on the level of the exchange rate movement, and if the trading is based on noises rather than information, it is possible to find a positive correlation between positions in spot, forward and futures, and subsequent exchange rate volatility. For this reason, we take a look at the association between these two variables.
Positions in Spot, Futures and Forward and Exchange Rate Volatility Table 3 presents the results of bivariate Granger-causality tests between positions in spot, futures and forward (which we shall call "spot positions" in this subsection for short) and exchange rate volatility. In the pooled sample, we can reject, at the five percent level, the null hypothesis of no causality from spot positions to exchange rate volatility at the one, two and four week horizons (the middle column). But we cannot reject no-causality from exchange rate volatility to spot positions. This pattern is broadly repeated for each of the five individual currencies. Thus, the data reveals that increases in the absolute value of the positions in spot, forward and futures are associated with increases in the subsequent exchange rate volatility, but not the other way around.
We also conduct Granger-causality tests between the absolute value of positions in all products (spot, futures, forward and options) and exchange rate volatility (reported in Table 4 ).
Naturally, we find exactly the same pattern as in Tables 2 and 3 . This similarity in patterns across positions in different currency products suggests that the options positions (together with positions in other products) cannot be entirely taken because of good information about future volatility.
They are likely taken, at least in part, to speculate on the level of exchange rate movements.
Large Participants' Ability to Forecast the Level (First Moment) of Exchange Rate
The last paragraph naturally leads to the following question: Do large market participants have better abilities to forecast the level (the first moment) of exchange rates? We investigate this question using two methods: a regression and a non-parametric approaches.
It is useful to point out that all we can hope to test is a union of two observationally equivalent hypotheses: (a) Large participants have superior information about exchange rate movement so that they buy (sell) on average when they anticipate a subsequent rise (fall) in the value of foreign currency;
and (b) Large participants have sufficient market power so that their action of purchase (sale) on average generates a rise (fall) in the value of foreign currency. In other words, if we find that subsequent appreciation of the exchange rate is predicted by large participants = current net purchase of the foreign currency, either or both hypothesis can be true. On the other hand, if we fail to find the positive correlation, neither can be true.
We should also note that given the nature of our data, we cannot test if the large participants have superior ability to forecast exchange rate movement within a day. Nor can we test if a subset of the participants in our sample have superior forecasting ability.
Parametric Approach: Regression Analysis
We begin with the following regression specification:
where S(t) is the exchange rate (value of foreign currency in units of domestic currency) at the end of week t, and FCP(t) is defined as the net foreign currency position (purchase) of the large participants at the end of week t. Either the better information hypothesis or the market power hypothesis would imply that $ > 0.
The results are given in Table 5 . The regressions on a pooled sample of all five currencies (top panel) show that, over almost all horizons (1 day, 2 days, 5 days, 1 week, 2 weeks, and 4 weeks), we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the coefficient on the foreign currency variable is zero even at the ten percent level. The only exception is for the 12-week horizon where the slope estimate has a wrong sign.
Disaggregating by currency, essentially the same pattern prevails for four out of the five currencies. The only exception is Japanese yen where a positive slope coefficient is observed for most of the horizons.
The overall results demonstrate that, at least for four out of the five currencies, the large participants as a group do not have better information on a systematic basis about the movement in the level of exchange rate, nor do they appear to possess a significant market power that alters the movement of the exchange rates to make their expectations self-fulfilling.
Non-parametric Approach: The Henriksson-Merton Test
The regression analysis in the last subsection examines the correlation between the magnitude of exchange rate appreciation with the size of foreign currency positions. Now we turn to a non-parametric approach developed by Henriksson and Merton (1981) . There are two reasons for this approach. First, the inference in the regression analysis assumed that exchange rate changes follow a normal distribution. This assumption is not supported by evidence (McFarland, Pettit, and Sung, 1982; So, 1987) . The non-parametric approach relieves us of the need to make the normality assumption. Second, if we maintain the normality assumption, we may view the hypothesis tested by the non-parametric approach as a weaker one: the direction (not magnitude) of currency appreciation may be correlated with a buy decision (regardless of the size of the buy).
Let R(t) denote the return on an investment from week t to week t+1, R(t) = S(t+1) -S(t), then, define p1(t) = prob [FCP(t) < 0 | R(t) < 0] and p2(t) = prob [FCP(t) > 0 | R(t) > 0].
Thus, p1(t)and p2(t) describe the conditional probabilities of a correct position given that the currency in question decreases or increases subsequently in value, relative to the U.S. dollar. Henriksson and Merton (1981) show that a necessary and sufficient condition for a forecast (or in this case, large participants = position) to have predictive value, is that the sum of conditional probabilities p1(t) + p2(t) must be significantly greater than 1. The position has no predictive value if actual and predicted returns are distributed independently, resulting in p1(t) + p2(t) = 1.
The test is implemented by classifying a sample of N observed positions and outcomes in the following manner:
Actual Returns R(t) < 0 R(t) > 0 Predicted Returns BPi(t) < 0 n1 N2 -n2
where N1 = total number of outcomes with R(t) < 0; N2 = total number of outcomes with R(t) > 0; n1 = number of correct forecasts given R(t) < 0; n2 = number of correct forecasts given R(t) > 0;
and defining n = number of times forecaster predicts that R(t) < 0, or n = n1 + N2 -n2 ; N = N1 + N2 = total number of observations.
Then, under the null hypothesis that position takers do not have superior forecasting abilities (or do not act in a stabilizing manner), the probability distribution of n1 (the number of correct forecasts given that R(t) < 0) is characterized by the following hypergeometric distribution and is independent of both p1(t)and p2(t):
Therefore, to test the null hypothesis, it is unnecessary to directly estimate either of the conditional probabilities, p1(t)and p2(t). Provided that N1, N2 and n are observable, the distribution of n1 is given above, with the feasible range for n1 given by:
Using the above equations to establish confidence intervals for testing the null hypothesis, a one-tail test (or at least one that weights the right-hand tail much more heavily than the left) is more appropriate than a two-tail test: if the market participants (i.e., forecasters) are rational, then it
should not be true that p1(t)+ p2(t) < 1. Thus, given a confidence level of C, one could reject the null hypothesis of no forecasting ability if n1 > x*(C) where x*(C) is the solution to:
For large sample sizes, it may be cumbersome to do the factorial computations, particularly when N1 . N2. Fortunately, it is for precisely these cases where N1 . N2 and where the sample sizes are large, that the hypergeometric distribution can be accurately approximated by a normal distribution. In these cases, we can use the following hypergeometric means and variances as parameters to the normal approximation:
We apply the non-parametric test to our data. And the results are presented in Table 7 . In the pooled-sample (top panel), we found that we can reject the hypothesis of no predictive power at the five percent level for 1-day, 2-day and 2-week horizons, but fail to reject for the 5-day, 1 week, 2-week, 4-week and 12-week horizons. When we go into disaggregated samples (i.e., currency by currency), the rejections are less frequent. There is no single currency for which we can reject the hypothesis of no predictive power at the five percent level for more than one horizon. Neither is there a horizon for which we can reject the hypothesis for more than one currency.
Thus, even for the less demanding task of forecasting the direction of exchange rate changes, not their magnitude, large participants = positions have at most some weak power.
One may imagine that if the currency positions of the large participants do not forecast subsequent direction of the foreign currency appreciation, maybe their adjustment, i.e., changes in the currency positions, does. Table 7 reports the results of such tests. If anything, the results are even less favorable to the large participants = forecasting ability.
Conclusion
Using a newly released data set by the U.S. Treasury, we investigate the relationship between foreign currency positions, including those of the derivatives, taken by very large market participants, and exchange rate movement.
There are several important findings. First, both the absolute value of the options positions and the absolute value of the spot, forward and futures positions are positively correlated with a subsequent increase in exchange rate volatility. This suggests that position-taking by large market participants is likely to have contributed to an increase in the exchange rate volatility.
Second, a regression analysis suggests that position-taking by large participants does not help to forecast subsequent appreciation of the exchange rate. A non-parametric approach indicates that large participants are not likely to have a systematic ability to forecast even the direction, let alone the magnitude, of the exchange rate movement. These findings are inconsistent either with the hypothesis that large participants have superior information about exchange rate movement, or with the hypothesis that they have market power so that their purchases of foreign currencies tend to raise their value.
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